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Revolutions from above:
Worker training as trasformismo
in South Korea*
Phoebe Moore
While making very substantial changes to the popu-
lation’s working conditions, government strategies to
foster economic development in South Korea have
historically attempted to keep worker involvement, in
terms of inﬂuence on the process, to a bare minimum.
Applying the Gramscian concept of passive revolution,
this article analyses governance mechanisms and
production relations over a history of authoritarianism
and up to the contemporary period of democratic
reform. Trasformismo, which is a strategy of limited
concessions, has been provided via vocational training
for workers. Despite this attempt at inclusion, it is
concluded that workers have not enjoyed full partici-
pation in negotiation for their welfare at any time in
Korean history.
This article analyses a manifestation of social change in the
once heralded Asian Tiger, South Korea (hereafter shortened
to ‘Korea’), and the mode of governance surrounding
vocational education training (vet) strategies and other
strategies of trasformismo (transformism) that aim to facilitate
economic development and worker convergence with
international standards. Workers are the fuel and fire of
economic development and the backbone of any production
system; they are vitally aﬀected by global political economics
but, paradoxically, are the most under-researched group in
International Political Economics (ipe) (O’Brien, 2000: 89-
99). With that in mind, this article presents a case study of
Korean workers’ experience of being ‘trained’ to adapt to
hegemonic capitalist norms over several decades of state-
led, Western-guided economic development in South Korea.
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The notion of convergence, or the ‘ability’ of nations to
replicate industrialised countries’ development trajectories,
was both implicitly and explicitly a part of imf restructuring
schemes such as those applied to South Korea in 1998 and
onwards. Advanced industrial countries compose the core
membership of the ‘convergence club’ (Magariños, 2001),
and benchmarking of ‘best practices’ for the creation of
national wealth emanates from this base. Observers have
noted a number of possible reasons for the failure of
convergence strategies, many of which correspond to the
discrepancies discussed by Rowley and Bae (2002). These
include factors such as the mismatch of particular cultural
value systems.1 But as Paul Cammack has pointed out,
experts at the World Bank believe they hold the solution to
lagging nations’ seeming inability to catch up with developed
countries.
Cammack (2002a)2 discusses the World Bank’s intent to
construct a Global Architecture of Governance (gag), which
is a metaphorical ‘architecture’ designed to guide
convergence in a way that the Bank perceives to be the most
eﬀective. In 1999, World Bank President James D.
Wolfensohn composed a comprehensive development
framework (cdf) that provides a list of actions designed to
aid developing countries to achieve ‘structural and social
aspects of development’ (1999: 3; see Figure 1).
The framework recommends development within
particular categories: structural, human and physical; and a
wider category of ‘specific strategies’ that includes rural,
urban, private sector and special national considerations.
Wolfensohn believes that the World Bank and imf are
responsible for overseeing and providing surveillance for
all nations’ development, and that these institutions are in
possession of a form of superlative knowledge supporting
the best possible methods of national economic development.
The gag involves imf intervention and the pastoral role
that this un, specialised agency has played in stories of
restructuring across the globe. It advocates benchmarking,
or the ‘system of continuous improvements derived from
systematic comparisons with world best practice’ (Sklair,
2001a: 115).
The contradiction of the World Bank’s disciplinary
mandates within the gag lies in its prescriptions for
completion. A nation is expected to follow the guidelines of
the cdf, but it must also take ownership of development
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(Cammack, 2002a: 41). Nations are expected to accept and
digest the World Bank’s decisions for the best practices of
development, and to ‘own’ and to take charge of the
implementation process of these practices. Without
‘ownership’, nations are predicted to remain less successful
in restructuring. But how can a nation own a process of
development that is so entrenched in the restrictive,
ideological expectations defined by the World Bank, and by
the global forces of speculators who demand evidence of
‘best practices’ and actively encourage a ‘comprehensive
development framework’?
Figure 1. The Comprehensive Development
Framework
A. Structural
1. Good and clean government
2. An eﬀective legal and justice system
3. A well-organised and supervised financial system
4. A social safety net and social programs
B. Human
5. Education and knowledge institutions
6. Health and population issues
C. Physical
7. Water and Sewage
8. Energy
9. Roads, transportation and telecommunications
10. Sustainable development, environmental and cultural
issues
D. Specific strategies-rural, urban, and private sector
11. Rural strategy
12. Urban strategy
13. Private sector strategy
14. Special national consideration
James D. Wolfensohn, ‘A Proposal for a Comprehensive
Development Framework’, 21 January 1999.
This article looks at how South Korea claimed ‘ownership’,
and mastered a particular process of knowledge production
surrounding economic development and crisis-restructuring
through the incorporation of vet, which is calculated to
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incorporate workers into a hegemony of development
ideologies. Operationalising the Gramscian concept ‘passive
revolution’, which exists in a case of unsuccessful hegemony,
I look at the mode of governance under which these events
have occurred.
I conclude that the conditions of government leadership
surrounding training historically reﬂect those of a passive
revolution, and are similar to those evident during the more
contemporary period of crisis restructuring. This has
occurred despite democratisation, but in most cases, the
Korean government-led process of knowledge production
is a response to the international forces and pressures involved
in the construction of an architecture of governance.
Korean educators have acquired the characteristics,
parameters and methods for accomplishing the right type of
‘development’, as defined by the World Bank from a
distinguishable source. Adrian Leftwich stresses that it is
‘Western “knowledge” about development, which defines what
it is and how it3 happens, and what should be done and by
whom and to whom and with what objectives in mind’ (2000:
64).
A population’s consciousness of its own underdevelopment
is managed by Western political and economic power, and is
disseminated by government agencies and international
institutions such as the imf and the World Bank. The
universalising of this knowledge is the final point of
Gramscian hegemony. Gills emphasises that an integral
hegemonic mode of accumulation requires not only an
international division of labour, and a legitimate political
order, but also ‘an ideology which conditions historical
consciousness to allow accumulation, and social order, to
occur in that specific historical form’ (1993: 189). Augelli
and Murphy note that ‘ideologies are always instruments of
power, because it is only with a merging of thought and
action that the historical role of humanity ... can be regained’
(1988: 21).
The analysis here aims to inform a case study that
demonstrates how the transformation and adaptation to
ideologies of global capitalism, according to the principles
put forward in the gag, have been ‘owned’ by the semi-
peripheral state South Korea in molecular stages through a
government-led project toward ideological adaptation.
Groups that seek hegemonic leadership build a common,
consensual worldview among various social classes and forces
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(Bieler, 2001: 98), and present this worldview to subordinate
groups as beneficial and necessary, and worth ‘owning’
nationally.
Education is an obvious institution with which to enforce
a potentially dominant worldview, wherein elite groups use
‘the tools of the war of position, the various ideological
apparatuses ... to pre-empt the creation of an hegemony by
the working class’ (Showstack Sassoon, 1987: 210).
This article outlines the Korean state’s accumulation
strategies over time in relation to a series of attempted
hegemonic projects. Findings appear to support a proposed
historical continuity of the conditions for passive revolution.
These events are traced over a historical period stretching
from authoritarian developmentalism in 1948-1979, to the
economic crisis of 1997 that resulted in a cacophony of
recovery and reform. Along this historical timeline, I discuss
government-regulated and -led vet because it is indicative
of governments’ eﬀorts to force accumulation strategies
forward.
The argument is divided into four sections. I first discuss
the Gramscian concepts of passive revolution and
trasformismo, in order to substantiate later claims emerging
from empirical research of Korean vet4 and other forms of
social co-optation. The second section outlines the molecular
changes of capitalism within the Korean economy that have
occurred under three dictatorship regimes, from 1948 to the
period of democratisation in the 1980s.
Over time, international pressures to globalise and to
improve development and ‘best practices’ became
increasingly pervasive, and this is noted throughout the
historical periods in question. In the third section, I ask
whether passive revolution has ‘“present” significance’
(Gramsci, PN [Prison Notebooks]: 118), even after democra-
tisation, leading into the late-1990s when the Asian economic
crisis paved the way for imf-guided restructuring. The section
focuses on the trasformismo of restructured vet strategies,
and highlights conditions of governance within which these
have been aﬀected.
The fourth section contains some final comments on the
links between the theoretical analyses and empirical findings.
I conclude that Korean economic development is continuing
in the non-hegemonic environment of passive revolution,
and thus that it opens up possibilities for worker dissent and
contestation to emerge.
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 1. Conditions for passive revolution
A case of passive revolution can be noted when a govern-
ment’s accumulation strategies are elite-engineered, and do
not succeed in garnering hegemonic consensus or the
formation of a hegemonic historical bloc5 from the wider
society. It is a ‘revolution without a revolution’ (Adamson,
1980: 186), and a type of ‘socio-economic modernisation
[occurring] so that changes in production relations are
accommodated within existing social and institutional forms
but without fundamentally challenging the established
political order’ (Morton, 2003: 632). The theory demonstrates
restructuring in such a way that it does not challenge capitalist
social relations, but alternatively does not achieve the social
status of what could be compared with Taoist artistic
spontaneity. The leading class, in order to resist the
ascendance of the subordinate classes’ potential gain of
hegemony, enacts passive revolution and uses trasformismo
strategies to rein in citizens’ support for the ‘revolution’, in
what is ultimately an elite project of change (Showstack
Sassoon, 1987: 210).
Van der Pijl (1993) discusses the elite-guided historical
formation and transformations of socialist Russia, and
succinctly refers to formations of class that have occurred in
what Gramsci calls ‘successive waves’ (PN: 114) within the
conditions of passive revolution. Van der Pijl quotes Gramsci:
‘passive revolution combines the notions of (a) a ‘revolution
from above’ without massive participation ... and (b) a
creeping, ‘molecular’ social transformation in which the
progressive class finds itself compelled to advance in a more
or less surreptitious, compromised fashion’ (PN: 108, quoted
in Van der Pijl, 1993: 239). Van der Pijl’s case study notes
molecular changes within Russia, i.e. the ‘organic social
compromise’ (1993: 244) that occurs under the conditions
of passive revolution. Below, I observe the way in which
capitalism has been reformulated throughout Korean history,
under a series of regime changes and their corresponding
accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects. Molecular
changes to Korean vet programmes correspond with elite
groups’ interest in hegemonic control, through the
articulation of skills norms to workers.
For the purposes of this article, I have noted two of the
conditions under which passive revolution has occurred in
South Korea. The first condition is simply the lack of
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consensus in society regarding development strategies. The
nature of ‘passivity’ within passive revolutions ‘refers to the
way challenges may be thwarted so that changes in production
relations are accommodated within the current social
formation’ (Morton, 2003: 634). So societies’ passivity is
not ‘passive’ in the most commonly understood sense, but
indicates a state’s ability to initiate a form of revolution or
change that occurs either by intervention, or by gradual re-
incorporation of ‘new social groups’ (2003: 634-5) into what
remains a dominant discourse. In this sense, the government
maintains leadership without widespread consent for its own
revolutionary strategies. The state-led ‘revolution’ is
represented by an accumulation strategy, i.e. export-led
developmentalism, or neoliberalism.
The second category of ‘conditions’ focuses on states’
hegemonic projects and trasformismo. Morton emphasises
that ‘hegemonic projects are typically oriented to broader
issues grounded not only in the economy but the whole sphere
of state-civil society relations’ (Morton, 2003: 636).
Hegemonic projects are elite-organised and -run passive
revolutions that are designed and propagated in progressive
terms. For this piece, I discuss vet programmes in the realm
of hegemonic projects, because workers’ abilities are a very
important part of state-led accumulation strategies. A
government that is capable of convincing its population of
the merits of state-envisioned political and corporate
strategies increases its chances of consolidating hegemony,
owing to its eﬀorts to involve the nation via the coaxing
eﬀorts of trasformismo. Passive revolution is the reassertion
of the dominant class’s rhetoric, and ‘the establishment of a
new State, or a political superstructure generally suited to
the eventual dominance of the capitalist mode of production’
(Showstack Sassoon, 1987: 210).
The state, alongside various consultants, often designs a
locally placed economic framework for the norms of
production that creates a set of rules for social relations of
production. There are particular requirements and expecta-
tions for this dominant mode of social relations of production:
in the process of trasformismo, all other modes are inferior
and discredited. Trasformismo describes the absorption of
potentially opposing forces that may disrupt passive
revolution, involving the incorporation of cultural, social,
economic, and political leaders into the networks of the elite;
but by definition, it does not involve consensus across society.
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The interests of a dominant class are enforced through the
re-articulation of another group’s ‘needs’, via reformist
rhetoric that counteracts revolutionary stances. The process
of adoption of standardised norms of production occurs via
the elite’s articulation and enactment of the strategy of
trasformismo. Cox writes that ‘social conﬂict is not eliminated
(it never could be) but it is institutionalised and regulated’
(Cox, 1989/1996: 246); and this is executed in the context
of trasformismo.
Gramsci noted the signs of trasformismo in Italian politics
with Giolitti’s6 co-optation of workers into its political
economic strategy. Giolitti aimed to create an ‘urban bloc’
of workers and industrialists, and applied both sanctioning
and favour-granting measures to this eﬀect (PN: 94). The
dominant class, in this case, had succeeded in prescribing a
social order that was forcibly implemented and thus did not
succeed in acquiring hegemonic status. Thus the conditions
of passive revolution are seen by the reassertion of the
dominant class’s rhetoric into terms that are palatable for
the masses; but are not necessarily consensual or beneficial
to subordinate groups. This has several implications,
including a lack of organic intellectual support for
accumulation strategies, and also involves the introduction
of externally conceived ideas about development that provide
some extent of legitimacy to the activity of a ‘globalising’
state.
Cox writes that Gramsci distinguished between ‘two kinds
of societies’ in relation to passive revolution. The first type
of society is a post-developed nation that has ‘undergone a
thorough social revolution and worked out fully its
consequences in new modes of production and social
relations’. The second type is a society like Korea: one that
has ‘thrust upon them aspects of a new order created abroad,
without the old order having been replaced’. This latter type
of society is thus caught in a ‘revolution-restoration’, within
the limitations of passive revolution: ‘neither the old forces
nor the new forces could triumph’, indicating a lack of
hegemony (Cox, 1983: 165-166). In this sense, passive
revolution involves the introduction of external ideas and
externally designed social relations of production.
The next sections break down three historical periods
within Korea’s modern history that include phases of
‘developmentalism’, ‘authoritarian/state corporatism’, and
‘neoliberalism’, and analyse the extent to which structural
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transformation in Korea demonstrates passive revolution.
In order to identify passive revolution within each period,
the two categories of conditions discussed above are
unravelled in the analysis of vet programmes and other
struggles between social forces, throughout Korean history.
2. The history of vocational education training under
conditions of passive revolution
This section covers the history of developmentalism through
to the 1980s, placing governance and trasformismo in the
context of changing accumulation strategies and hegemonic
projects. Within each historical period, I outline how events
may reﬂect the two categories of conditions for passive
revolution: elite-engineered development, and the accom-
panying strategies of trasformismo.
After liberation from Japan, from 1948-1979 the Republic
of Korea industrialised rapidly under the two consecutive
military bureaucratic presidents Syngman Rhee and Park
Chung-hee, who facilitated and directed Korea’s economic
development and modernisation under regimes of develop-
mental paternalism (Deyo, 1989: 103-105). ‘Developmental
paternalism’ is based on the idea that governments have a
moral responsibility to the public, and both presidents placed
an emphasis on hard work and sacrifice for national
prosperity. Both governments appealed to post-war national-
ism, which reduces the risk of political dissent and may unite
opposing forces. This is a form of trasformismo, because it
aids in ‘revolution-restoration’; and it is similar to what
Gramsci noted in the formation of the Italian State, as parties
became closely aligned due to molecular changes of
ideologies (Gramsci, Risorgimento: 157; in PN: 58).
The first president of the Republic of Korea relied on un
assistance and us aid for reconstruction. During Rhee’s term
of presidency, the United States took over the Education
Bureau and formed an Educational Council, demonstrating
external inﬂuences in the development process: ‘beautiful
imperialist[s]’ had finally reached Korea (Shambaugh,
1991)—beautiful, anti-communist imperialists (Hong, 1983:
226). Pro-modernisation critics welcomed the ‘beautiful’ anti-
communist imperialists from the us, whose rhetoric claimed
to have rescued Korea from the Japanese and saved South
Capital & Class #8648
Korea from the communism of the North (Hong, 1985: 226),
and us-led education reﬂected these convictions. ‘Doing good
for others’ was the ideology behind the American-directed
construction of the Republic of Korea (krivet, 1999: 114).
Education institutions promoted the ideological slogans
‘doing it for yourself ’, and ‘working industriously’ (p. 114).
A single-form system of education was introduced at this
time, which was intended to provide an alternative to the
Japanese totalitarian system. In the single-form system,
vocationally trained students and students from the
humanities in the formal education system were not meant
to be diﬀerentiated between socially.
In reality, vocationally trained individuals were not
attributed the same level of social esteem as those educated
in a formal institution (p. 115). Later, during Park’s era of
leadership, within every vocational school and training centre
the phrase ‘skilled workers are the standard bearer of the
modernisation of our country’ (p. 117) was posted for trainees
to read.
President Park envisioned four five-year economic
development plans, in order to facilitate his accumulation
strategy of export-led industrialisation. Park’s first five-year
plan encouraged ‘guided capitalism’ (Cliﬀord, 1998: 49). The
plan actually stated that ‘Throughout the plan period, the
economic system will be a form of “guided capitalism”... in
which the government will either directly participate in or
indirectly render guidance to the basic industries and other
important fields’ (p. 49).
The government maintained a leadership role in its
accumulation strategy. In terms of the expectations placed
on workers, Park’s economic system required ‘brutally long
working hours, high rates of savings and investment, and a
hierarchical, authoritarian system that rewarded those who
succeeded and punished those who did not co-operate’
(Cliﬀord, 1998: 45). In a dramatic speech, Park encouraged
workers to take on the strenuous responsibility of fighting
for a historic goal: ‘We must work. One cannot survive with
clean hands ... smooth hands are our enemy’ (p. 47). This is
an interesting mixture of elite-led development and the
appeal to human sentiment—the latter of which is
characteristic of trasformismo.
During Park’s first plan (1962-1966), more than 80 per
cent of exports were of forestry and fishery products,
agricultural products, and raw ores (Cliﬀord, 1998: 54).
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There was a shortage of appropriately skilled workers, which
led to the promotion of a plan to train 8,000 workers—a
number that quickly expanded to 9,000. Then it was
announced that 10,000 individuals would receive training
over an eighteen-month period month (krivet, 1999: 119),
according to government mandates. In 1964, a vocational
training bill was passed by the Ministry of Labour (mol),
and it stressed the following points:
... the securing of labour power (skill, talent) in terms of
quality and quantity is the one and only economic policy
... the authorisation and management of the results of
vocational training by the state is appropriate in terms of
skill management and will aid in the improvement of
worker awareness ... the objective is to plan job
improvement at the same time as economic development
through the nurturing of skilled workers necessary for
industry and other businesses by integrating the former
job stability law and the skill acquisition system of a
workers’ standard law. (krivet, 1999: 120)
These guidelines indicate the government’s direct leadership
over the accumulation of industrial and manufacturing labour
power. Amsden states:
The wheeling and dealing, horsetrading, and traﬃcking
that characterised this process were reminiscent of the
reciprocity that characterised relations between the state
and the privileged classes under dynastic rule ... the state
used its power to discipline not just workers but the owners
and managers of capital as well. (Amsden 1989: 63, 64)
In 1967, at the beginning of Park’s second economic plan
(1967-1971), the face of vocational training changed when
the government installed a publicly-funded Central
Vocational Training Centre, with financial and supervisory
aid from the undp and the ilo. This change was the beginning
of the government’s project to internationalise worker vet
programmes and, within the conditions of passive revolution,
was complimentary to, and not transformative of, its overall
political and economic development strategies. A license-
training process was implemented at this time, and businesses
gradually phased out in-plant training programmes (krivet,
1999: 127).
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Without worker consent, the government carefully guided
the next two development plans (1972-1976; 1977-1981), and
workers were expected to comply with each transition.
Overall, during Park’s five-year economic plans, the system
of vocational training was marked by ‘confusion’ (Amsden,
1989: 223). The government tried diﬀerent strategies to
accommodate the accumulation strategy inherent to its
‘plans’, but without hegemonic consensus from all social
forces, confusion was inevitable. This confusion was a feature
in the question of which academic institution should provide
training (high schools or junior colleges), and also in the
question of whether the public or private sector should finance
its provision. The confusion was partially resolved by an
amendment to the Vocational Training Law in 1975, which
required firms with more than 300 workers to provide in-
plant training. However, no checking mechanism was
instituted, and this law was deemed ineﬀective.
By 1976, 125,000 craftspeople had passed the final exams
at vocational training centres provided by one automobile
business group. Amsden claims that the training was not
comprehensive (1989: 224). Hyundai Construction was one
of the first companies to reach out across the ocean in
contracting. The company was ‘forced to upgrade the quality
of their construction work, as required by u.s. federal
regulations concerning subcontractors’ (232). Then, in
1977—the first year of Park’s fourth plan—there was an
increase in foreign agreements for technology transfers. The
government was gradually beginning to open its doors to
foreign involvement, and external advances into the market
became increasingly evident.
The Kwangju Massacre in 1980 was a mark of the social
chaos of the time; and in 1979, President Park had been
assassinated. A new form of opposition movement, Uijang
(the students’ movement), was simmering. Students left
university in their thousands and took jobs in factories with
the intention of helping to organise uneducated workers
(Ogle, 1990: 99). Radical students became the core of the
labour movement in the 1980s. Korean unionisation was
highest in the craft industry and among production workers
in manufacturing positions (Deyo, 1989: 77) but, finally, in
1985 the first skilled workers’ strike occurred in the Daewoo
automobile production plant (Cumings, 1998: 381). The
strike was immense, and riot police fought brutally with
demonstrators.
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Even after his death, Park’s fifth development plan
continued, but it ended in 1981 as martial law was handed to
Chun, and Korea experienced six more years of similar,
dictatorial leadership. In the spring of that year, Korean police
tortured a student to death, triggering widespread protests.
On 13 April 1987, President Chun told the nation that the
government would not revise the constitution, despite there
having been several meetings to discuss it, and that his own
government would handpick his successor from the existing
Electoral College system. Chun chose Roh Tae-woo as the
presidential candidate—a man who had been in close co-
operation with Chun in the clashes against civilians during
the Kwangju incident. The 13 April speech caused a significant
amount of both governmental and social dissatisfaction, and
caused a split in the opposition New Korea Democratic Party.
Both Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, both of whom
would become presidents in later years, abandoned the party
and created the Party for Peace and Democracy (ppd:
Pyeonghwa Minjudang; Okonogi, 1988).
The reorganisation of the parties at this time is an
indication of trasformismo, because there was no authentic
break-oﬀ from the dominant party but merely the formation
of another ideologically similar party. Passive revolution
indicates ‘the constant reorganisation of state power and its
relationship to society to preserve control by the few over
the many, and maintain a traditional lack of real control by
the mass of the population over the political and economic
realms’ (Showstack Sassoon, 1982: 129). The reorganisation
of parties indicates this molecular shift.
While previously, students and low-skilled workers had
predominantly been involved in resistance activity, after 13
April 1987 the movement changed in that journalists,
university professors, religious leaders and skilled workers
joined in protest. Okonogi states that ‘within Korean society,
where religious feelings run deep and intellectuals are highly
respected, these actions had a great impact’ (1988: 26). For
the first time, middle-class citizens and skilled workers joined
activists in protest, rioting against the government. In the
crisis of unrest, the government finally conceded, and agreed
to reconsider a constitutional revision and more ‘democratic’
policies. Widespread unrest at this time shows the inability
of the government to gain hegemony; the government
responded by making molecular changes to its rhetoric via
trasformismo. However, this is not the end of the story.
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The introduction of a more ‘democratically’-run Korea
was not a smooth process, due to the nature of Korea’s history
of authoritarian development. Kim and Moon (2000: 54)
attribute Korean economic development to an intervention
of geopolitics, a market-moulding state, aggressive export
promotion and formation of human capital, and Confucian
culture. Inherent in those factors are several contradictions
to democracy. While democratisation changed the Korean
political and economic climate to some degree, it did not
directly follow that Korea could claim to be a successful
case of integrated and hegemonic democratisation. Gramsci
makes the following comment regarding hegemonic
democracies:
In the hegemonic system, there exists democracy
“between” the leading group and the groups which are
being “led”, in so far as the development of the economy
and thus the legislation which expresses such development
favour the (molecular) passage from the “led” groups to
the “leading” group. (NM: 160, in pn: 56)
This comment is consistent with Gramsci’s understanding
of consent as a factor of integral hegemony.
Despite formal democratisation, hegemony was still not
evident; but from 1987-89, trade unions multiplied and
labour disputes increased. At first, the Roh government
relaxed its former intervention tactics, and business-level
negotiation—or the attempt at such—between management
and workers became more common. Then, between 1990
and 1992, at a time of economic downturn, the government
resumed an anti-union stance and union membership began
to decline. Employers appreciated the government’s stance
in this regard as they attempted to implement ‘new business
strategies’, including ﬂexible wage systems based on
performance evaluations, requiring certain skills that became
increasingly prevalent in vet programmes. The strategies
were a foreshadowing of the restructuring programmes that
would be led by the imf and a host of mnc managers a few
years later.
Following democratisation, labour, management and the
government had conﬂicting objectives. Workers wanted to
see democracy in the workplace through bargaining power
and work stability, but management prioritised ﬂexible market
conditions. Kim Young-sam, the first civilian president of
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South Korea, began his term in 1993 and was immediately
faced with these conﬂicts. The conditions for democracy
ideally include widespread opportunities for the voice of
the people to be heard, including that of workers. At this
time, Korean workers sought the removal of bans to multiple
unionism, and the ban on third-party intervention in cases
of labour/management struggles. The government most often
sided with management, however, with the goal of creating
ﬂexible labour market conditions (Kim & Moon, 2000: 57).
Unions’ political activity, furthermore, was not allowed.
Simultaneous with democratisation, the Kim government
pursued a heavily-loaded segyehwa (globali-sation) campaign.
Once again, external forces were at work in the accumulation
strategies of this president’s era.
In November 1994, President Kim declared his vision
for segyehwa to ‘lift the global role of the nation and make
the life of future generations better’ (Korean Embassy, 1999).
Segyehwa was touted using a progressive tone: President
Kim told senior oﬃcials who were suspicious of foreign
intervention that segyehwa was not the same thing as
internationalisation, because economics would not be the
focus. Globalisation would positively aﬀect other facets of
society: politics, diplomacy, education, athletics and other
such non-economic factors (Bowbrow & Na, 1999: 183).
President Kim told the international business realm, at a
conference in 1996, that segyehwa was a term that represented
Korea’s push to eliminate corruption and the ‘wrongs of
history’, and that his aim was to focus on ‘transparency,
openness, a clean government, and a clean society’ (Bowbrow
& Na, 1999: 187). These progressive statements were part of
a hegemony-seeking campaign. President Kim’s plan was to
achieve global neoliberal standards in South Korea. The us
in particular encouraged Korea to open its markets fully,
and to abandon regulation and protectionism. Kim hoped
that segyehwa could aid this process and bring the nation
together, based on what he hoped would be a shared vision.
Kang claims that:
Segyehwa dealt with the external challenges ... in several
ways. In response to market-opening measures targeting
South Korea, segyehwa as a rhetoric served to give some
political cover to Kim Young Sam’s government, which
was unable to resist the United States’ arm-twisting.
Segyehwa was used as a slogan enabling South Korea to
Capital & Class #8654
acquiesce to market openings as part of its larger
globalization drive. That is, segyehwa was a useful, if
uncertain, psychological tool that helped the nationalistic
South Koreans accept a measure of reciprocity in
international trade. (Kang, 2000: 85, 86)
Kim believed that his nation would be left behind in the
rapidly liberalising world if it did not position itself to be
competitive through deregulation. But before long, Kim’s
‘non-economic’ segyehwa strategy claims were discredited
when he actively sought membership of the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd). Kim
hurriedly passed deregulation measures; other measures
intended to encourage Korean overseas investment were
outlined in the Five-Year New Economic Plan for 1993-7,
and in the Long-Term Economic Design for the Twenty-
First Century. South Korea was accepted into the oecd in
December 1996 (Kang, 2000: 86).
President Kim ran a form of state that Deyo calls
authoritarian/state corporatism. This type of government
‘invites symbolic or co-opted participation in limited
decision-making, and in some sense, is at least nominally
less exclusionary than simple exclusion’ (Deyo, 1989: 108).
Kim’s hegemonic project rhetorically aimed to invite society
to build democratic participation. Nonetheless, labour was
excluded from decision-making during his presidency. In
1996, before the economic crisis tested the resilience of the
Korean economy, eleven laws described as ‘anti-labour’ by
the Militant were passed, which included provisions allowing
employers to activate mass layoﬀs, and simplified procedures
for hiring temporary, part-time and replacement workers.
The Employers’ Federation justified this by claiming that
the new measures ‘would be used only if firms were in extreme
diﬃculties’ (Militant, 1997): a strange foreshadowing,
considering the actual ‘diﬃculties’ that would occur one year
later. Alongside these assurances in 1996, the Federation
oﬀered to arrange ‘development programmes that focus on
vocational training. Neither union federation gave credence
to the oﬀer’. So job ﬂexibility was paired with a new form of
‘security’, in the form of vet.
This sequence of consistent, observable characteristics
within the historical periods discussed here points toward
the adaptation of capitalism to historical circumstances.
Conditions for passive revolution were in place: first, Korean
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economic development occurred under state leadership of
its initiated accumulation strategies, without hegemonic
integration.
Second, elements of trasformismo or the progressive nature
of vet and hegemonic projects, and external inﬂuences, have
been evident within each historical period. But is there a
‘present significance’ of passive revolution? The next section
addresses this question by looking closely at the restructuring
period that followed the Asian economic crisis of 1997; a
crisis that shook the nation, and led to further adaptations
of capitalism. Furthermore, I seek out the conditions under
which restructuring was applied, in order to note how Korean
vet has reconfigured in the absence of hegemony.
3.  The present significance of passive revolution
Within a year, the euphoria of gaining oecd membership
waned when the eﬀects of the Asian economic crisis7 took
hold in Korea. Just as the crisis came to a head, in 1997,
President Kim Dae-jung was elected. The crisis hit Korea
worse than it did other nations across the region, and drastic
measures were taken to reform the economy, to attract foreign
capital and to try to avoid future crises. But crisis reform
aﬀected workers most directly and negatively, due to job
cuts.8 If workers could not keep jobs in the insecure post-
crisis situation, they were expected to join vet programmes
that would make them ‘employable’. If workers were
privileged enough to remain in employment, they were
expected to attend developmental vet that would aid in their
retention of ‘employability’. The government’s hegemonic
project was intended to involve workers by providing the
means for them to ‘help themselves’. Yet it corresponded
directly with the labour power needed to accommodate the
state’s emerging accumulation strategy of neoliberalism.
The main change to vet in the period following the
economic crisis in Korea was that the state’s accumulation
strategy became a blueprint of imf leadership—a classic case
of reform and restructuring aimed at meeting the standards
of global neoliberalism. This process led to the increased
involvement of external forces in vet development. Training
programmes began to prompt new forms of consolidation
and convergence that would dissolve cultural norms and
practices, and ultimately fragment any terrain for resistance
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to state-led and internationally-informed internationalisation
strategies (Cox, 1987: 253). The progressive tone of
trasformismo thus emphasised internationalisation initiatives
and, as usual, excluded those less privileged by globalisation.9
In terms of trasformismo during neoliberalism, new forms
of knowledge became commodified assets in the international
environment and were translated into Korea’s vet
programmes, in order to train workers toward the global
‘norms’ of the time. Leadbeater believes that state guidance
for this process has increased in importance due to ‘its role
in producing knowledge, through the education system’
(1998: 379). The Kim government began to manage the
unprecedented requirements for curriculum development and
content via partnerships with international groups, which
claim ownership of what is considered lucrative worker
‘knowledge’ in the contemporary context of neoliberal
capitalism.
New expectations for workplace performance were placed
on workers, who were put under pressure to remain or,
alternatively, to become employable following the economic
crisis. In order to maintain control and to sideline potential
social crises or uprisings in opposition to development
strategies, the government intended to absorb any fragments
of society that posed a threat, by providing the means to
obtain ‘employable’ knowledge through the much-lauded
medium of vet programmes. The specific content of the
knowledge expectations is discussed below.
Laid-oﬀ workers were opposed to forced training
programmes because of unwillingness, or because of their
suspicion of the limited short-term benefits of the schemes,
which demonstrates the lack of consensus for these initiatives.
Through framing the government-required training
programmes as positive incentives for personal development
(in a tone of trasformismo) and, in the post-crisis era, as a
means to remain or to become ‘employable’ after the
enormous amount of lay-oﬀs, the government applied a
‘strategy on the part of the dominant power to gradually co-
opt elements of the opposition forces—a strategy known in
Italian politics as trasformismo’ (Cox, 1999: 25).
‘Trasformismo can serve as a strategy of assimilating and
domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them
to the policies of the dominant coalition and can thereby
obstruct the formation of class-based organised opposition’
(Cox, 1983: 166-7).
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The Korean government sidelined potentially dissident
groups by providing a social safety net of vet programmes,
in order to appease laid-oﬀ workers who were most likely to
oppose elite-led accumulation strategies. In this way, the
government can be said to have enacted the strategy of
trasformismo in the crisis-reform era.
On 9 February 1996, the establishment of the unprece-
dented Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education
and Training (krivet) had been proposed as a part of the
Educational Reform for the Construction of a New Vocational
Education System. By 27 March of the next year, the krivet
Act (Act no. 5315) came into eﬀect. The Institute was then
founded on 10 September 1997 as a government-funded
institution, just as the economic crisis erupted across Asia.
Since 1997, krivet has controlled vocational education and
human resources, and composed curricula that complimented
the government’s reform and recovery strategies.
In response to the crisis, and in response to the
multinational corporations that entered the economy rapidly
in response to deregulation requirements, the government
took over all areas of vet in partnership with unesco. The
government worked specifically with the ilo and unesco’s
International Project on Technical and Vocational Education
(unevoc) to establish government-led, reform-oriented vet
programmes, and general vocational training within
businesses was completely abolished in 1998.
Workers were thus expected, from 1997 onwards, to fulfil
government objectives for production and skill acquisition.10
The top-down nature of recommendations for skills
acquisition indicates that workers’ participation in
development was, once again, elite-engineered during the
reform period.
The Presidential Commission for Educational Reform
designed the Second Education Reform Programme that
involved vet reform, the main change being the introduction
of the ‘Lifelong Vocational Education System’ (koilaf,
1999c: 108). The ‘new labour culture’ (koilaf, 2001: 11; Lee,
1999: 1) was a campaign instigated by ministers of Labour
in 1997, which enjoyed continued propagation into the next
century.
The campaign introduced new work-training programmes
involving classes, videos and literature designed to prepare
companies for foreign management and/or new policies. The
main thrust was to implement a change in perspective: ...
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[a] total shift in perspective among workers and businesses,
and the government, will be necessary for Korea to compete
in the new century, where national borders have lost their
significance. Korea must observe a new paradigm of labour
relations in which employers and workers are partners in
every sense of the word. (Minister Lee Sang-ryong, 1999)
For employers and workers to be ‘partners’ they would
need to identify common ground on several counts; but the
failed attempts at conclusive dialogue within two Tripartite
Commissions indicates that this partnership has not been
established. Instead, the Ministry of Labour (mol) pursued
international partnerships intended not simply to guide the
nation toward development, but to bring Korean work styles
into line with those of the developed nations of the
‘convergence club’ (Magariños, 2001).
With impetus from unevoc,11 the mol incorporated
‘universal’ ideas regarding what makes people employable
in particular nations, took ownership of those ideas, and
unilaterally instituted ‘Knowledge-Economy’ preparation vet
programmes. The design and utility of such programmes
demonstrate the state’s strategy to integrate workers—the
group that had had the least political participation throughout
Korean economic development—into economic
development. Workers as represented by unions did not enjoy
a political participatory function, but were expected to behave
as active, eﬃcient, ﬂexible participants in economic
development, and to take increased responsibilities for their
own status as employable.
The Vocational Training Promotion Act no. 5474 of
December 24 1997 started a trend by changing the titles of
vet facilities to vocational ability development training
facilities. The title ‘vocational training’ itself was transformed
into ‘vocational ability development training’, and ‘vocational
training instructors’ became ‘vocational ability development
training instructors’. In paragraph (2) of the same Act, public
vet institutes were changed in name to ‘public vocational
ability development’ training facilities, and vocational
training to ‘vocational ability development training’,
respectively (mol, 1999).
‘Ability’, a relatively ambiguous term used repeatedly in
the emerging training institutions, refers to a particular work
ethic included as part of training procedures—a new priority
towards a less tangible kind of worker power than concrete
skills alone.
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These rapid changes were externally introduced by
unevoc experts, but the Korean government has been very
good at claiming ownership of such tasks, which were
presented as necessary components of ‘workers’ skills
development’, designed to help workers to become employ-
able and to maintain their own status of employability.
Workers were expected to assume new responsibilities
and skills for the international work standard, regardless of
previously acquired skills. One author has pointed out
potentially problematic areas for an educative scheme of
neoliberalisation:
? How to internationalise attitudes within education systems
that have traditionally stressed national values and culture.
? How to co-ordinate skills supply and demand in
increasingly volatile markets, and with the pressures for
political and economic neoliberalisation.
? How to generate the creative and innovative capacity
required of future leading economies with education
systems traditionally stressing passive learning and social
conformism. (Green, 1999: 270)
krivet assumed new responsibilities and goals for worker
training, taking on these problematic concepts under the
direction of the Ministry of Education and the mol and on
18 October 2000 it was inaugurated as the unesco Regional
Centre of Excellence in Technical and Vocational Education
and Training. Thus krivet was transformed into one of the
oﬃces of the regional unevoc centre for the Asia Pacific
region. This occurred as the General Assembly of unesco
resolved to reinforce technical and vocational education and
training via expansion of its international programme. The
head oﬃce of unevoc was established in Bonn, Germany in
September 2000, and has regional centres across the globe.
In Seoul, unevoc has one main and three associate centres,
the former located at the krivet site and the latter in the
buildings of the Ministry of Education, in the oﬃce of the
Industrial Education Policy Oﬃcer and at the Korea
Manpower Agency.
On September 18 2000, the Labour Reform Task Force
was activated—a group chaired by the vice-minister for
Labour, who reminded the nation that ‘labour sector reform
is crucial to enhance competitiveness of an enterprise and a
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nation and improve living quality of workers in this era of
unbridled competition’ (mol, 1999). The following are some
of the main points of the task force’s objectives:
? Livelihood protection measure
— Innovation in the operation of job security centres and
manpower banks
— The establishment of a three-year plan for Vocational
Ability
? Development
— The diversification of labour diplomacy and international
exchanges
— The formulation of measures to expand inter-Korean
exchanges
— Co-operation in the labour sector (mol, 1999)
The requirements of the task force highlight the
importance of labour power and its capabilities in the reform
period, and are reﬂected in government and internally-led
strategies for worker education. This process occurred
predominantly through government relations with
international organisations, and aimed to transform labour
in order to meet premeditated behaviour targets. These new
relations meant that the government and businesses became
more deeply involved in vet programmes than ever before,
through dialogue and interaction with the research institute,
and through negotiations about the content of skills training
itself.
Kevin Cleaver, World Bank director and author of the
Bank report released in February 2002, reported that:
Tapping into the Knowledge Economy goes beyond
investing in communications and information
technologies. It means having the capacity to use
knowledge eﬀectively by putting in place the right
economic and institutional framework, giving people the
skills they need to exploit these opportunities, and funding
local innovation centres that guarantee the continuous
ﬂow of fresh ideas.12
Foreign experts, particularly in newly-merged multinational
companies, began to teach the new requirements of work
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competence. One example of such a vet strategy was that of
the multi-sector conglomerate Samsung, where employees
are considered loyal, aggressive and innovative. These
strategies emerged before the economic crisis, but have been
intensified in this period. ‘Samsung has had no strikes.
Employees feel that their needs are met ... [Samsung] plans
to increase its social responsibility’ (Kim, 1996). Many
companies began to assign reading matter to employees:
‘companies provide a list of required reading and say, “If
you don’t want to read them, leave”’ (ibid). Other companies
used such techniques to improve the ‘voluntary’ participation
of employees, with implications for job retention. The leaders
in what is known as ‘reading management’ are Korean Mobile
Telecom, Samsung, Hyundai, Sunkyong and E-Land. These
companies maintain that it is crucial to follow the guidelines
of restructuring in order to meet the demands of a globalising
economy; and, using trasformismo-laden rhetoric, companies
and the government intend to absorb any potentially opposing
ideas to the propagation of the accumulation strategies of
neoliberalism.
During and after the restructuring period that began in
1997, and following the aforementioned guidelines, the
management of these companies introduced the idea of
voluntary participation in training schemes, albeit with
incentives for participation. vet participation provided a rare
opportunity to secure employment; a clear case of the
government’s trasformismo strategy. One of the side eﬀects
of neoliberal development is the need for a ﬂexible work
force.13 When the government recommended a form of vet
that encourages workers to become ‘ﬂexible’, it rephrased
the concept to incorporate a motivation for ‘lifelong learning’.
This is a form of trasformismo, because despite the
articulation of their positive outcomes for workers’ self-
improvement, nonetheless these ‘alternative’ vet incentives
were steered by the capitalist class’s accumulation strategy.
This can also be seen in the new incentives that were
introduced under the Employment Insurance System, an
institution that was designed to reduce the risk of job loss
after the Lifetime Employment laws had been revised (koilaf,
1999b).
Employees were eligible to enjoy the benefits of the
System—if, that is, they enrolled voluntarily in the Vocational
Competency Development Programme. In order to
encourage voluntary participation, the government oﬀered
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businesses two forms of support: subsidies for the
implementation costs to employers; and paid leave, for
employees, for training. In 1997, 13,888 firms were entitled
to oﬀer the programme to employees. The support and
advocacy of vocational and technical training and education
in Korea is the key for the next phase of economic
development. This training included new ideological
information that would oﬀer skills for competency within
the knowledge economy, and train employees to apply new
work-styles based on individual performance and
‘competence’.
The promotion of these new characteristics of labour
performance includes several elements that contrast with
previous Korean requirements for employable skills. Rowley
and Bae (2002) observe how core ideologies of human
resource ﬂows, work systems, evaluation and reward systems
and employee inﬂuence can be systematically contrasted with
the introduction of new requirements. Traditional Korean
work practices include the prioritisation of an aﬃliate
organisation over the individual; emphasis on collective
equality; and community orientation over individual equity
and market principal orientations. The new requirements
made of workers became increased job mobility and
ﬂexibility, and there was an emphasis on the development of
professional, skilled workers. These skills took precedence
over more craft-based or manufacturing work skills. However,
the ‘ﬂexibility’ rhetoric aﬀects unskilled workers in more
negative ways than it does skilled. While ﬂexibility means
lifelong learning and opportunities for previously ‘skilled’
workers, it means job loss for others.
In the contemporary scenario of forced training
programmes, one study produced by krivet indicates worker
dissatisfaction, and reluctance to attend the programme.
Participation Factor of Training Programmes (krivet, 2000)
shows that 47.4 per cent of training attendees participated
because it was compulsory, whereas 14.9 per cent attended
training programmes voluntarily. This gap indicates that
discord remains, despite the government’s wish that workers
should be ‘partners’ in development. So workers do not tend
to participate in programmes with full compliance or consent,
but are expected by the government to comply, as is the case
in passive revolution.
What this means for Korea is that membership of the
expanding global political economy of neoliberalism
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requires more than just entrance into the oecd or the wto,
and democratisation. It not only requires the consolidation
of state interests for development, but also requires notable
societal transformations that go deeper than the material
restructuring funded by the imf. Without even the likelihood
of immediate worker consent, the government has resorted
to old leadership methods within the means of passive
revolution. So, in Korea, a significant increase in external
inﬂuences can be noted in terms of the introduction of new
ways of work and development, presented using a progressive
tone, for citizens’—and thus the nation’s—improved status
in the global economy of neoliberalism.
4. Analysis and conclusion
As has been shown by a historical analysis of Korean
economic development through several passive revolutions,
capitalism itself has not ﬂed the terrain but has been re-
articulated through a series of incremental changes. Work
standards and ‘employability’ have been re-articulated via
elite-authored vet programmes, and conditions for passive
revolution have existed at all stages of development. While
molecular changes in vet curricula have accommodated the
accumulation strategies of governments over time, the
overarching appeal of capitalist integration into gradually-
emerging international norms has been the motivating force
for elite-led, trasformismo-driven and, thus, non-hegemonic
development.
This analysis of passive revolution in the national context,
as inﬂuenced by external forces, demonstrates the struggle
for realised consensus between states and societies, and
indicates the potential for frag-mentation of what has become
an increasingly interna-tionally-oriented project of capitalist
hegemony (Van der Pijl, 1993) in Korea. In fact, in the
contemporary context, international pressures are the driving
motivation for a particular form of development that is
becoming increasingly expansive across nations.
During the period of dictatorship from 1948-1993,
presidents expected workers to find comfort in nationalism
and work for the benefit of their country, and to meet the
standards as such. Even after democratisation there has been
little relief in the workplace, as people have been forced to
adjust to ‘market forces’. Following the 1997 economic crisis,
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the Kim government sought international aid for workers’
skills improvements and convergence. This is an incremental
change that suits the contemporary strategy of accumulation
—that of neoliberalism and the creation and ascendance of
a knowledge economy in Korea.
A significant critique that might be made on the basis of
this analysis is that economic restructuring in Korea
privileged white-collar, highly skilled workers, particularly
in the era of restructuring for neoliberalism. Privileged
workers were able to retain employment, often in companies
that merged with multinational corporations.
Despite the newly introduced idea of ‘ﬂexibility’ of the
labour force, ‘employable’ workers enjoyed continuous work.
Less skilled workers have not been permitted a significant
voice in development strategy designs, and more highly
skilled workers were incorporated into elite-governed
objectives via incentives and training opportunities. For less
skilled workers, training opportunities were a requirement
whose logic or ‘incentive’ was job retention, and even then,
job ﬂexibility presented an ever-present threat.
Groups which are severely underprivileged by
development are perhaps most likely to initiate dissent.
Because ‘economic restructuring is occurring at all levels ...
resistance movements cannot defeat it by concentrating on
one level alone; capital can always side-step such opposition’
(Amoore et al, 2000: 25).
Therefore, resistance may emerge from a widened worker
consciousness of oppression. If dissent exists in a form that
is a threat to the mechanism of the vet programmes, it could
indicate the fragmentation of international hegemony
(Arrighi, 1993), which is at the heart of the supposed ‘best
practices’ (Appelbaum & Batt, 1994) needed for a globally
competitive labour force for the knowledge economy.
However, if Korea ‘owns’ the process of restructuring in
response to supposedly immutable forces of globalisation
and economic development, it will increasingly be required
to make choices regarding the treatment of workers. This
article has demonstrated that vet is one tool applied by
Korean regimes in order to attempt to accommodate workers
in the rapid and painful economic transformations. It has
argued that vet appears to suit an elite-led programme of
development, and that it provides only surface-level
concessions to workers in a style very common to trasformi-
smo-led strategies.
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me the time to work on this piece.
1. See also Salamon (1997) and ‘National and organisational
culture and institutions’ (Rowley & Bae, 2002).
2. See also Cammack (2001) and (2002b).
3. ‘It’ here refers to practices of development, which
Leftwich discusses in the paragraph previous to this
quotation. He outlines the argument of development as
a discourse of domination (2000: 59-69).
4. Information about vet in South Korea was gathered during
several trips to Seoul, during which I conducted interviews
with researchers at krivet, and gathered several English-
language publications from various locations. 6 Gramsci’s
view of a hegemonic historical bloc is a ‘fusion of material,
institutional, inter-subjective, theoretical and ideological
capacities’ (pn: 366). This historical period is thus
composed of an organic link between political and civil
society, and it is ‘not just an alliance, but a dialectical
unity of base and superstructure, or theory and practice,
or intellectuals and masses’ (Forgacs, 1988). The complete
realisation of a historical bloc occurs at such a time that
a hegemonic class achieves leadership by way of the
universalisation of particular ideas, such as ‘best practices’
for development.
6. Giolitti was the Italian prime minister 1892-93, 1906-
09, 1911-14, and 1920-21 (PN: 94, n. 68).
7. See F. Godemont (1999) for an in-depth analysis of the
eﬀects of the crisis on the Asia Pacific region.
8. Between 1995 and 1999, unemployment increased
drastically, from a low 2 per cent in 1995 to 8.4 per cent
in 1999 (Rowley & Bae, 2002: 534). This percentage
increased during the restructuring period of the economic
crisis, beginning in late-1997.
9. Cox discusses how international production divides
workers into three broad and hierarchical categories. The
first category of workers is integrated into the system of
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management and research and development; in the
terminology of Sklair (1997, 2001a, 2001b) and Van der
Pijl (1997, 1998), these workers are members of the
transnational capitalist class (tcc). Second, there are those
workers in more precarious positions, who are subject to
labour ﬂexibility practices and enjoy little job protection.
Third are the excluded groups. This final group includes
small, low-technology enterprises and the unemployed
(Cox, 1999). The two latter groups are completely
marginalised from the tcc, and from the Korean
government’s strategies, in the contemporary context of
globalisation.
10. The following describes the type of manpower needed
in order to enrich the government’s accumulation strategy
for neoliberalism: ‘Manpower with intelligence, skills,
creativity and willingness, and the knowledgeable [sic]
are critical for sharpening competitive edge in the era of
infinite competition. The inﬂexible wage system has failed
to induce eﬀorts by companies to improve productivity
and workers’ vocational abilities, thereby weakening
Korean companies’ competitiveness. It is becoming
increasingly important to lay a solid ground for economic
recovery through remodelling corporate infrastructure
and creating an atmosphere where workers of ability are
valued’ (koilaf, 1999: 11).
11. ‘unesco’s International Centre for Technical and
Vocational Education and Training was established in
September 2000.  It is dedicated to developing and
improving technical and vocational education and training
in unesco’s Member States. Its focus is on information
exchange, networking and international cooperation’
(unevoc, 2002).
12.  The World Bank’s Knowledge Economy Forum was held
in Paris in February 2002, and included presentations
from representatives of Ireland, Finland and South Korea
—all countries which have ‘leap-frogged the development
process through smart acquisition and use of knowledge’;
World Bank (2002) A Preliminary Strategy to Develop a
Knowledge Economy in European Union Accession
Countries, prepared for the Knowledge Economy Forum
(Paris, 20-22 February 2002), organised in co-ordination
with the European Commission (ec) and the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd).
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13.  The following recommendations for economic
development are representative of neoliberal ideology:
1. Fiscal discipline.
2. A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward
fields oﬀering both high economic returns and the
potential to improve income distribution, such as
primary healthcare, primary education, and
infrastructure.
3. Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the
tax base).
4. Interest rate liberalisation.
5. A competitive exchange rate.
6. Trade liberalisation.
7. Liberalisation of FDI inﬂows.
8. Privatisation.
9. Deregulation (in the sense of abolishing barriers to
entry and exit).
10. Secure property rights (Williamson, 1990).
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